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SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION NEARLY A QUARTER OF CENTURY ago, the foreign policies of the 
post-Soviet states have undergone significant (and sometimes contradictory) transformations. External actors 
have played a crucial role in this process. The United States and, later, Russia and the European Union invested 
significant resources in shaping the domestic and foreign policies of the post-Soviet states in their bid to 
influence the regional order or promote their vision of international politics (Bechev 2015; Nitoiu 2017). In turn, 
most states in the post-Soviet space were left with little choice but to develop multivector foreign policies and 
strike a fine balance between their own interests and those of more powerful external actors (Hey 2003; 
Browning 2006; Gnedina 2015). This context has affected not only the way post-Soviet states have defined their 
foreign policy goals but also the tools they developed to pursue their interests. Moreover, post-Soviet foreign 
policies have been shaped by the values and norms that external actors sought to promote in the region (Averre 
2009; Delcour 2013a). In this context the special issue discusses the way the external actors—that is, the United 
States, Russia and the European Union—have affected the development of the foreign policies of the post-
Soviet states in the last 25 years.  
In the early post-Soviet era, the United States supported countries in the region in their transition to a 
market economy and to build viable democratic institutions. This approach was based on the perennial US 
policy principle that considered the advancement of democracy as a step towards the promotion of global peace 
and stability: as such, the US had a duty to aid the new post-Soviet nations (Tolstrup 2013). The United States 
hence gradually invested significant resources and effort in building the capacity of the post-Soviet states with 
the aim of replacing their old Soviet identities with liberal democratic nations that would align more naturally 
with the West than Russia. This primarily entailed supporting civil society groups, investing in infrastructure, 
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funding exchange programmes for policymakers stakeholders and students, and encouraging US companies to 
invest in the region. In the 1990s, the State Department and other policy institutions, with the support of 
numerous US universities and think-tanks invested heavily to build the diplomatic expertise of the new post-
Soviet states, while the US government more broadly had an interest in investing in their energy infrastructure 
and extractive industries in order to integrate them into the liberal economic system (Stent 2015). As the 1990s 
progressed, however, the post-Soviet states largely failed to democratise and in some cases (e.g. Belarus, 
Moldova, Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan), even developed authoritarian regimes. Although Washington turned at 
times a blind eye to the abuses of various authoritarian regimes in the region, this broad development, coupled 
with the US involvement in other parts of the world, and the Middle East more in particular, led in the beginning 
of the 2000s to the progressive dilution of the US interest in the region. This gap, in turn, was to be gradually 
filled by the European Union. 
The post-Soviet space has been perceived by the post-Cold War political sphere as deeply Rooted in 
Moscow’s sphere of interest. , (Thorun 2008; Gvosdev & Marsh 2013; Tsygankov 2013; Snetkov 2014; Cadier 
& Light 2015). Moscow has sought to retain  a degree of control and foster reconsolidation of the former Soviet 
republics through various regional economic and security initiatives, including the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, and the Eurasian Economic Union. In practice, 
Kremlin supported pro-Russian elites across the former Soviet Union in order to facilitate the adoption of adopt 
neutral, and often overtly pro-Russian foreign policies. To this end, Moscow used a variety of tools: military 
intervention, fostering separatism and ethnic conflict, freezing conflicts, supporting economic coercion and 
manipulating energy prices.  
The European Union only started to engage with the region in the early 2000s, during the build-up to 
its 2004 enlargement. At the time, the conventional wisdom in Brussels was that, if the European Union 
intended to become a relevant international actor, it had to develop and maintain a strong presence in its 
immediate neighbourhoods(Biscop & Andersson 2007). Unlike Russia, however, the EU made a clear 
differentiation in the post-Soviet space between its so-called ‘eastern neighbourhood’ (Moldova, Georgia, 
Belarus, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Armenia) and Central Asia: while the latter became a marginal EU concern in 
the last 15 years, the European Union has focused on shaping the foreign policies of its eastern neighbourhood. 
Influencing the foreign policies of its eastern neighbourhood is considered by Brussels as a necessary step to 
make EU borders more secure and to enhance the stability and economic development of the region (Averre 
2009; Raik & Dinesen 2015; Nilsson & Silander 2016). In contrast to Russia, the European Union has employed 
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a narrow range instruments to achieve this end, placing its action under the umbrella of conditionality (Lavenex 
2004). Essentially, the European Union has made further integration and subsequent social, political and 
economic benefits conditional upon the adoption of (sometimes very costly) domestic reforms and regulations.  
Faced with bids for influence by Russia and the European Union, along with that of other external 
actors (including China), the initial response of most post-Soviet states was to develop multivector foreign 
policies (Gnedina 2015). In their state- and nation-building efforts, these states benefited from cooperation with 
external actors but were also constrained by the competing interests of these same actors. [  
The literature on post-Soviet transition in the post-Soviet space has focused on domestic transformation 
(Schimmelfennig & Scholtz 2008; Ademmer 2015; Burlyuk 2015). By contrast, contributions to this special 
issue address how the foreign policies of the post-Soviet have responded to the pressures from external actors, 
primarily the EU and Russia. Maintaining multivector foreign policies has translated, in the case of most post-
Soviet states, into a mix of Soviet and Western-style practices and institutions. At the same time, these states 
have had to deal with the threat of separatism, ethnic conflict, bankruptcy, external intervention and energy 
shortages.Studies focusing on external actors from the West explore the ways in which they promote 
democratisation in the region or through external governance seek to export the rules, norms and regulations that 
underlie their own political systems. In this case the empirical focus is primarily on rule and norms adoption in 
the post-Soviet states, together with the implementation of various democratic reforms (Lavenex 2004; Freire & 
Kanet 2012; Delcour 2013b; Delcour & Wolczuk 2015). These studies seek to analyse the effectiveness of the 
efforts of the EU and the US to shape democratic developments in the post-Soviet space. Other studies focus on 
the more or less intentional efforts of Russia to promote autocracy in the post-Soviet space. The emphasis is 
here on the way Russia is able to obtain leverage in regional states by creating various linkages through both 
short-term incentives and coercion (Tolstrup 2013). The Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) tradition has analysed 
the development of the foreign policies of the post-Soviet states as examples of small states. This strand of 
scholarship views the influence of external actors as a constant structural factor to which small states have to 
adapt (Minasyan 2012). Studies in this vein have however failed to highlight that this is a dynamic process’.  
In this context, the aim of the special issue is to look at how external actors have sought to influence 
the post-Soviet space and how these efforts have affected the foreign policies of the states in the region. This 
approach, in turn, assigns agency to both the post-Soviet states and external actors, and helps analysing the 
dynamic relationships between their foreign policies. Contributions to this special issue evaluate in particular the 
strategies and tools used by external actors in order to enhance their influence in the region. Theoretical 
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perspectives range from more institutionalist approaches to those influenced by constructivist International 
Relations theory or critical international political economy.  
The influence of the European Union on the development of the foreign policies of the post-Soviet 
states is explored in Cristian Nitoiu’s article, which focuses on the role of ideas and narratives in foreign policy, 
using the concept of the ‘ideal self’. This ‘self’ is the benchmark that defines a state’s foreign policy strategies 
and interests, and against which they are judged. The ideal ‘self’ frames a state’s understanding of various key 
concepts (the nature of the international order, power, status, legitimacy) and roles in world politics. The article 
explores in detail the role of the post-Soviet space in sustaining the European Union’s ideal self: to claim a more 
significant global status, the European Union needs to demonstrate that it is a strong and effective actor in its 
immediate neighbourhood. In the second part of the article Nitoiu explains how the EU ideal self is currently 
reflected in the foreign policies of post-Soviet states. He concludes that this ideal self is only partly embraced by 
the post-Soviet states, who often tend to instrumentalise the European Union in their foreign policy and align 
with the Union primarily in situations where it fits their interests.  
Anna Matveeva focuses on Russia’s soft power in the post-Soviet space. She evaluates Moscow’s 
influence in the region and highlights the shift, following the Ukraine crisis, in the way Russia projects its soft 
power in the region. The article contends that, while before Euromaidan, Russia’s soft power strategy was 
somewhat chaotic and negle, after 2014 the Kremlin began to develop a more considered approach to projecting 
its soft power in the post-Soviet space. Moreover, Moscow developed a strategy which combines both the use of 
hard and soft power. This was based on the idea that achieving influence in the region is synonymous with 
interfering in the domestic politics of the post- 
Soviet states. in the domestic politics of the countries in the region. Consequently, Russia has stepped up its 
efforts to promote soft power, from the mere use of economic tools to a sustained strategy focused on multiple 
actors (political or non-governmental) in the post-Soviet space. The article focuses on the cases of Belarus and 
Moldova, and contrasts the impact of Russia on their foreign policies. Matveeva finds that while Belarus is very 
much dependent on Russia as the junior member in the Union state, along with its position as transit country for 
Russian energy resources and the presence of Russian troops, Moldova has to large extent been ignored by the 
Kremlin following the [breakdown of the 2003 Kozak Memorandum on the status of Transnistria’. 
Azerbaijan’s ‘exceptional’ and increasingly assertive foreign policy is analysed in Eske van Gils’s 
article, which looks specifically at EU impact on Baku’s foreign policy by focusing on two key areas of EU–
Azeri relations: the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the EU’s promotion of democracy and human rights. The 
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article evaluates the effectiveness of a series of foreign policy strategies employed by Azerbaijan in order to 
manage the pressure from the EU. These include lobbying member states, protesting EU policies, creating 
linkages between the various policy areas, framing the EU in negative terms in the public sphere, responding to 
criticism with criticism (or ignoring it) and undermining the implementation of EU policies in Azerbaijan. The 
article concludes that the main aim of these strategies has been preserving Baku’s autonomy and independence 
in foreign policy. However, van Gils finds that Azerbaijan’s use of these tactics has only been partly successful 
in steering its relations with the EU.  
The issue of multivector foreign policies in the post-Soviet space is analysed in Nicola Contessi’s 
contribution. The article  posits that multivector approaches in foreign policy should be understood  to be more 
complex than the simple balancing act between the interests of more powerful external (which is the common 
understanding found in the literature). For Contessi, post-Soviet states tend to divide their foreign policies 
according to various issues and ‘auction’ these issue areas to the highest external bidder. Rather than being 
powerless international actors, in this conceptualisation, multivector approaches provide increased agency and 
autonomy to the post-Soviet states, allowing them to play external actors against each other and secure deals 
without developing conflictual relations with other powerful states. More precisely, ‘auctioning’ allows post-
Soviet states to simultaneously aling  their foreign policies simultaneously with various external actors. The 
empirical part of the article looks at the case of Kazakhstan and the way it has offered various parts of the 
energy infrastructure  to Russia and China. In this way, Astana has exercised agency in foreign policy and 
established itself as a vital link in the transport web connecting the region. .  
Vsevolod Samokhvalov’s article focuses on the way in which ideas have influenced in the development 
of Russia’s foreign policy towards its ‘near abroad’. He contends that the idea of greatness in Russian foreign 
policy has been framed in relation to two regions: the Slavic areas of the Balkans and the Black Sea region. 
These two regions have historically been at the centre of the great power narrative embraced by Russian leaders. 
The article contends that a key aspect of this narrative is Russia’s interaction with its perceived understanding of 
‘Europe’. The evolution of the Kremlin’s engagement with and understanding of Europe has in turn affected 
Russia’s policy towards its neighbours, including the post-Soviet states. Samokhvalov shows that in the case of 
Moldova and Georgia, Russia has on repeated occasions tried to act as a mediator to resolve their frozen 
conflicts. Nevertheless, Moscow has been reluctant to accept any initiatives from actors in these countries who 
failed to consider Russia’s interests and has derailed any peacekeeping efforts that did not  afford it a central 
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role, thus prolonging the frozen conflicts. Consequently, the autonomy or agency in foreign policy of states such 
as Moldova or Georgia has been considerably reduced. 
Kornely Kakachia and his co-authors focus on the way various political forces in Georgia understand 
and construct their country’s foreign policy. To this end, the essay takes as its reference the 2012 parliamentary 
elections, which, as the first peaceful and democratic transition of power, constituted a landmark in Georgian 
politics. The article uses a constructivist framework to analyse a major shift in Georgia’s foreign policy 
discourse towards normalising relations with Russia, as promoted by the winner of the elections, the ‘Georgian 
Dream’ coalition. While Saakashvili’s ‘National Movement’ perceived cooperation with Russia as 
compromising Georgia’s sovereignty and independence, the coalition emphasised the need to identify common 
interests.  
Karyna Shyrokykh argues that in the case of Ukraine—and the other post-Soviet states—the interplay 
between external and domestic factors is vital to the analysis of change in foreign policy. In terms of external 
factors, her article highlights that, much like the other post-Soviet states, Ukraine has been forced by the 
structural conditions of the post-Cold War period to balance between the pressure exerted by Russia and its 
ambitions for European integration. Shyrokykh shows that the multivector strategy based on balancing between 
the West and Russia has its roots in Ukraine’s early post-Soviet statehood. Nevertheless, the success of 
multivectorism was often threatened by Moscow’s unwillingness to fully come to terms with Ukrainian 
sovereignty and independence. The second part of the article highlights how Ukraine’s ‘European choice’ has 
been supported by normative claims, especially the promotion of human rights, linked in turn to democratisation 
and modernisation of the state.  
 
Conclusion 
The Ukraine crisis has brought the geopolitical situation in the post-Soviet space to the top of the international 
agenda. For many analysts, Russia’s intervention in Ukraine is a sign that we are entering a so-called new Cold 
War, a period of intense rivalry between the West and Moscow (Heisbourg 2015; Kroenig 2015; Monaghan 
2015; Black & Johns 2016; Legvold 2016). In this new geopolitical global configuration the post-Soviet space 
has become a key point of conflict between the Kremlin and the West. The goal of this struggle is achieving 
effective influence on the foreign and domestic policies of the post-Soviet countries. The current chaotic nature 
of the global order (as well as the post-Soviet space)   makes the special issue even timelier, as arguably 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine have been driven by the fear of losing sway over Kyiv’s foreign policy. Russia has 
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seen the region as its sphere of influence, where it has both the duty and right to shape the polities of the states 
in the region (Allison 2017). The West, led by the United States and, from the 2000s onwards, the European 
Union, has developed a more nuanced approach of promoting liberal values and reforms through conditional 
benefits (Nitoiu 2017).  
In the last few years, the West has been preoccupied by external crises (Ukraine, Syria) and internal 
pressures (the rise of populism, as evidenced by the election of Trump and the Brexit vote). To that extent, 
influencing the foreign policies of the smaller states in the post-Soviet space has not ranked as such a priority on 
the agenda of the European Union or the United States, and financial support has been correspondingly lower 
than in the was in the 1990s. Both the European Union or the United States, at least rhetorically, expressed their 
commitment to helping other nations democratise and develop. The 2015 EU Global Strategy is characterised by 
a principled pragmatism: the European Union will continue encouraging other states to adopt a liberal agenda in 
their domestic and foreign policy while taking into account their needs and interests.1 At the same time, the 
concept emphasises that the European Union is more open to sacrificing the promotion of values over the 
pursuit of its interests in relation with other states. On the other side of the Atlantic, however, the Trump 
presidency signals a move towards isolationism and possibly a gradual withdrawal from pursuing actively 
policies aimed at influencing the external relations of the post-Soviet states.  
The election of Putin to his fourth term in March 2018 will probably strengthen Russia’s resolve in 
world politics and fuelits actions in Ukraine, Syria and the post-Soviet space as a whole. Nevertheless, for much 
of the 1990s, Russia was focused more on its domestic issues and  did not develop a coherent strategy for 
influencing the post-Soviet space. Impact  was primarily a by-product created during the Soviet Union between 
leaders of the post-Soviet states and Moscow. Only after Putin started to take a clear line on Russia’s interests 
and place in the world that did not accord with Western norms and ideals following the ‘coloured revolutions’ 
has the Kremlin investing in a strategy for influencing the foreign policies of post-Soviet states (Nitoiu 2016; 
Feklyunina 2017, pp. 34–8), including the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union. The Ukraine crisis has 
ushered in an era in which Russia is more assertive in trying to shape the foreign policies of post-Soviet states. 
However, this assertiveness has come at a price, namely the loss of influence over Ukraine’s foreign policy, as 
the post-Maidan government in Kyiv has been distancing itself from the Kremlin.  
                                                          
1 ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’, European External Action Service, June 2016, 
available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf, accessed 27 March 2018. 
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The rationale of the West and Russia for attempting to influence the foreign policies of the post-Soviet 
states can be viewed through two interconnected perspectives. Firstly, the region has been at various points one 
of the key areas for extending the civilisational models of Russia, the United States and the European Union. Be 
it liberalism, in the case of Western powers, or an emphasis on sovereignty or conservative values, in the case of 
Russia, the post-Soviet states have been at the centre of the clash between various civilisational models. The 
ideational aspects of the foreign policies of these states thus reflect a hybrid international identity , a mix of 
Soviet, European, internationalist and conservative values. Secondly, these states have had to balance between 
the interests of the West or Russia]. As small states they have had to choose between developing multivector 
foreign policies or aligning almost completely with one pole or the other. Shifting from one stance to the other 
has proven, in the case of Ukraine and Georgia, to be detrimental in the short term and has attracted aggressive 
actions from Russia.  
While the influence of external actors is an important element in analysing foreign policy development 
in the post-Soviet states, most articles in the special issue also point to the role of domestic factors: interest 
groups, corruption, , history and political culture. Future research might further explore the intersection between 
domestic and external factors in analysing the influence of the West or Russia on the development of post-
Soviet states. The special issue finally points to the fact that influence over foreign policy developments does 
not always translate into power for actors such as Russia, the United States or the European Union. Such an 
assumption denies the agency of post-Soviet states and, as most of the present contributions pointed out, greater 
agency needs to be attributed to small states when analysing their foreign policies.  
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